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Abstract
Starting from the notions of q-entailment and p-entailment, a two-dimensional
notion of entailment is developed with respect to certain generalized q-matrices
referred to as B-matrices. After showing that every purely monotonic single-
conclusion consequence relation is characterized by a class of B-matrices with
respect to q-entailment as well as with respect to p-entailment, it is observed
that, as a result, every such consequence relation has an inferentially four-valued
characterization. Next, the canonical form of B-entailment, a two-dimensional
multiple-conclusion notion of entailment based on B-matrices, is introduced, pro-
viding a uniform framework for studying several different notions of entailment
based on designation, antidesignation, and their complements. Moreover, the
two-dimensional concept of a B-consequence relation is defined, and an abstract
characterization of such relations by classes of B-matrices is obtained. Finally, a
contribution to the study of inferential many-valuedness is made by generalizing
Suszko’s Thesis and the corresponding reduction to show that any B-consequence
relation is, in general, inferentially four-valued.
Keywords: Inferential many-valuedness, two-dimensional entailment,
B-matrices, B-consequence relations, monotonic consequence relations,
q-entailment, p-entailment, Suszko Reduction.
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1. Introduction
A (logical) matrix is usually defined as a pair 〈A, D〉, where A is an algebra
similar to a propositional language L (we shall identify the language L with
its set of formulas), andD is a subset of A’s carrier set A (see, e.g., [15, 29]).
Intuitively, A (sometimes denoted as ‘V’) is a non-empty set of truth-values,
and D is a set of designated truth-values. If C is the set of connectives of
L, then 〈A, D〉 can be presented as a tuple 〈V, D, {fc | c ∈ C}〉, where fc is
a function on V with the same arity as c. With a view towards obtaining a
semantics for L, an entailment relation is associated to a given matrix in a
certain canonical way. For that purpose, a class of valuations is fixed, and
often, in order to obtain a ‘truth-functional semantics’, the class Hom(L,A)
of all homomorphisms of L into A is considered (see [22]). If M = 〈A, D〉 is
a matrix, the single-conclusion entailment relation |=M ⊆ 2
L × L induced
by M is defined as follows:
Γ |=M ϕ iff (ν(Γ) ⊆ D implies ν(ϕ) ∈ D, for every ν ∈ Hom(L,A)),
where ν(Γ) = {ν(ψ) | ψ ∈ Γ}.
If truth-functionality of the semantics is not required, the algebraic
structure of A is not exploited in the same way, so that the first component
of a matrix 〈A, D〉 may just as well be any set V, and Hom(L,A) may
be replaced by any collection S of functions from L into V. Given such
practice, the notion of a matrix can be broadened into a triple 〈V, D, S〉, as
is implicitly done in [4]. In particular, if S is a singleton set, then 〈V, D, S〉
may be seen as a semantical model based on the matrix 〈V, D〉.
Let M be a class of matrices. The relation |=M ⊆ 2
L × L (entailment
with respect to M) is defined by setting Γ |=M ϕ iff Γ |=M ϕ for all
M ∈M. A relation ⊢ ⊆ 2L×L is said to be Tarskian if for every ϕ, ψ ∈ L
and every Γ,∆ ⊆ L:
(Ref) Γ ⊢ ϕ, whenever ϕ ∈ Γ
(Mon) If Γ ⊢ ϕ then Γ ∪∆ ⊢ ϕ
(Trn) If Γ ⊢ ϕ for every ϕ ∈ ∆ and Γ ∪∆ ⊢ ψ, then Γ ⊢ ψ
Above, ‘Ref’, ‘Mon’ and ‘Trn’ stand, respectively, for reflexivity, mono-
tonicity, and transitivity (or closure). It can readily be checked that every
relation |=M is a Tarskian consequence relation.
Well-studied and important generalizations of the concept of a matrix
are G. Malinowski’s notion of a q-matrix [13] and S. Frankowski’s notion
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of a p-matrix [7, 8]. A q-matrix (quasi matrix) is a structure 〈A,D+,D−〉,
where A is an algebra similar to a propositional language L, and where D+
and D− are subsets of A, and D+ ∩ D− = ∅. Usually, D+ is referred to
as the set of designated values and D− as the set of antidesignated values.
A p-matrix (plausibility matrix) is a structure 〈A,D+,D∗〉, where A is an
algebra similar to a propositional language L and D+ ⊆ D∗ ⊆ A. The set
D∗ is usually referred to as the set of plausible, non-antidesignated values.
We adopt a compact notation that avoids superscripts and the bar-
notation for set-theoretic complementation, introducing the symbols Y,
Y
,
N, and Nto denote, respectively, the sets of designated, non-designated (V\
Y), antidesignated, and non-antidesignated (V\N) values. With a cognitive
twist, they might be taken as representing acceptance, non-acceptance,
rejection and non-rejection.1
If M = 〈A,Y,N〉 is a q-matrix, the q-entailment relation |=q
M
⊆ 2L×L
induced by M is defined with respect to a truth-functional semantics as
follows:
Γ |=q
M
ϕ iff (ν(Γ) ∩ N = ∅ implies ν(ϕ) ∈ Y, for every ν ∈ Hom(L,A)).
If M = 〈A,Y, N〉 is a p-matrix, the p-entailment relation |=p
M
⊆ 2L × L
induced by M is defined with respect to a truth-functional semantics as
follows:
Γ |=p
M
ϕ iff (ν(Γ) ⊆ Y implies ν(ϕ) ∈ N, for every ν ∈ Hom(L,A)).
These definitions are extended to classes of matrices exactly as in the case
of the Tarskian notion of consequence.
Let Q be the class of all q-matrices, and P be the class of all p-matrices.
Clearly, every q-matrix M = 〈A,Y,N〉 uniquely determines a p-matrix
Mp = 〈A,Y, A\N〉, and conversely, every p-matrix M = 〈A,Y, N〉 uniquely
determines a q-matrix Mq = 〈A,Y, A \ N〉. The functions (·)p and (·)q are
injective, for every M ∈ Q, we have Mpq = M, and for every M ∈ P,
we have Mqp = M. The functions (·)q◦p and (·)p◦q are thus bijections,
and every q-matrix (p-matrix) can be ‘seen’ as a p-matrix (q-matrix). In-
deed, Frankowski [8] “for the sake of convenience” considers q-entailment
1Malinowski [13] regards D+ as the set of accepted values and D− as the set of
rejected values. Since acceptance is usually associated with the attitude of belief, and
rejection with the attitude of disbelief, Malinowski’s understanding of D+ and D− may
be classified as doxastic.
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over p-matrices, and in [24] p-entailment is defined over q-matrices. More-
over, Frankowski uses a deductive perspective on p-matrices to investigate
q-consequence, and Malinowski [19] observes that while q-entailment gener-
alizes the Tarskian notion of consequence by changing the notion of proof,
the generalization produced by p-entailment changes the form of rules of
inference. That being said, we will not study in the present paper the asso-
ciated proof theory of either of these notions of consequence, but will focus
instead on their semantical and their abstract characterizations.
The relations |=qM (resp. |=
p
M), whereM is a class of q-matrices (resp.
p-matrices) are examples of what Malinowski (resp. Frankowski) refer to as
‘q-consequence relations’ (‘p-consequence relations’). A relation ⊢ ⊆ 2L×L
is said to be a q-consequence relation if in addition to (Mon) the following
quasi closure axiom is respected for every Γ ∪ {ψ} ⊆ L:
(QTrn) Γ ∪ {ϕ | Γ ⊢ ϕ} ⊢ ψ implies Γ ⊢ ψ
Quasi closure is a restricted form of ‘(cumulative) transitivity’, and clearly
constitutes a weakened version of the Tarskian axiom (Trn). A relation
⊢ ⊆ 2L × L is called a p-consequence relation if ⊢ satisfies reflexivity and
monotonicity. It can readily be checked that every q-entailment relation is a
q-consequence relation, and every p-entailment relation is a p-consequence
relation.
We will say that the language L has algebraic character in case it is the
term algebra generated by a set of propositional variables over a proposi-
tional signature. Endomorphisms of L are called substitutions. Given
one such substitution σ : L −→ L and given Π ⊆ L we write σ(Π) for
{σ(π) | π ∈ Π}. A relation ⊢ ⊆ 2L × L is said to be substitution-invariant
(a.k.a. ‘structural’) if for Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L, and every endomorphism σ of L,
the following axiom is respected:
(SI) Γ ⊢ ϕ implies σ(Γ) ⊢ σ(ϕ)
It is well known that every substitution-invariant Tarskian consequence
relation is characterized by a class of matrices (cf. [28]). In addition, Mali-
nowski [13] proved that every substitution-invariant q-consequence relation
is characterized by a class of q-matrices, and Frankowski [7] proved that
every substitution-invariant p-consequence relation is characterized by a
class of p-matrices.
In the present paper we will deal with certain generalized q-matrices
which we shall refer to as ‘B-matrices’. For B-matrices the restriction on q-
matrices according to which no value is both designated and antidesignated
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is abandoned.2 This generalization is less straightforward for p-matrices,
what makes it attractive to consider p-entailment and other forms of en-
tailment over B-matrices.
A (logical) B-matrix for L is a structure 〈V,Y,N, S〉, where Y ⊆ V ,
N ⊆ V , and the semantics S is a collection of mappings ν : L −→ V called
valuations. In case L has algebraic character and V is an algebra of the same
similarity type as L, one may naturally consider a truth-functional seman-
tics S defined by the collection Hom(L,V) of all homomorphisms from L
into V. Given a family M = {Mi}i∈I of B-matrices, we will associate to it
the semantics SM given by
⋃
i∈I Si.
As is well-known, the semantic characterization of Tarskian conse-
quence relations in terms of matrices gives room to the so-called Suszko
Reduction (cf. [3]), which shows that every Tarskian consequence relation
may be alternatively characterized by a class of semantical models with
two-element carriers. Roman Suszko [25] proposed indeed to distinguish
between ‘algebraic valuations’, which are homomorphic and which he also
called reference assignments, and ‘logical valuations’, which are not nec-
essarily homomorphic. From that perspective, what is normally called a
κ-valued logic may then be called a referentially many-valued logic. The
so-called Suszko’s Thesis (see [15, Ch. 4]) consists in the claim that every
referentially many-valued logic can be given a ‘bivalent description’, namely
a characterization in terms of so-called logical valuations whose codomains
have at most two ‘logical values’, the True and the False. As a practical
application of that idea, the Suszko Reduction, seen as the technical coun-
terpart of Suszko’s Thesis, has nowadays been given a fully algorithmic
implementation that applies to any finite-valued logic, and this has been
used to provide uniform classic-like analytic deductive counterparts to all
such logics (cf. [5]).
Grzegorz Malinowski is especially well-known for his investigation of
inferential many-valuedness (see [13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]). Such enterprise
consists in pushing the frontiers of Suszko’s Thesis in order to accommodate
2In [26], the set of designated values D of a matrix is required to be non-empty,
and in [6], D is required to be a non-empty, proper subset of V. Following the defi-
nition of matrices in [6], in [24, p.174] it is assumed that in a (generalized) q-matrix
〈V, D+, D−, {fc | c ∈ C}〉, the sets D+ and D− are distinct, non-empty, proper subsets
of V. With a view towards defining useful entailment relations induced by a matrix
or by a (generalized) q-matrix, these restrictions are quite natural and reasonable; for
the general characterization of consequence relations, however, such restrictions do not
apply.
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for other notions of consequence that do not in general allow for a bivalent
description. Malinowski [14] proved that every q-consequence relation has
a characterization by a class of q-matrices with three-element carrier sets,
and showed that the original version of Suszko’s Thesis did not apply in
general to q-consequence. Such characterization is said to be inferentially
three-valued, insofar as it makes use of the three sets Y, N, and V \ (Y∪N)
into which the carrier set of a q-matrix may be partitioned. Frankowski [9]
makes an analogous observation for p-consequence relations: to characterize
the latter as inferentially three-valued, he makes use of the three sets Y,
V \ Nand N\ Y into which the carrier of a p-matrix may be partitioned.
As we will see, in the case of B-matrices, the distinguished sets Y and
N do not, in general, give rise to a partition of the set V of truth values in
a similar fashion, and their corresponding (four-valued) inferential charac-
terization must be attained using a different strategy. Whilst, on the one
hand, a logical matrix displays only one distinguished subset of V, namely
D, and a second subset of V is given by the complement of D, on the other
hand a q-matrix or, more generally, a B-matrix, displays two distinguished
sets, Y and N. In [24], starting from such a generalized perspective on the
notion of a logical matrix, special attention is paid to the following four,
in general pairwise distinct, notions of entailment, with respect to a given
generalized q-matrix M:
t-ent.: Γ |=t
M
ϕ iff (ν(Γ) ⊆ Y implies ν(ϕ) ∈ Y, for all ν ∈ Hom(L,A))
f -ent.: Γ |=f
M
ϕ iff (ν(Γ) ⊆ Nimplies ν(ϕ) ∈ N, for all ν ∈ Hom(L,A))
q-ent.: Γ |=q
M
ϕ iff (ν(Γ) ⊆ Nimplies ν(ϕ) ∈ Y, for all ν ∈ Hom(L,A))
p-ent.: Γ |=p
M
ϕ iff (ν(Γ) ⊆ Y implies ν(ϕ) ∈ N, for all ν ∈ Hom(L,A))
We shall here build on that perspective and generalize it in various respects,
in particular by using the distinguished sets Y and N of a B-matrix to
originate the four logical values represented by the sets
Y
∩N,
Y
∩ N, Y∩N,
and Y ∩ N. In the present paper we will show how several distinct notions
of entailment, including all the ones mentioned above, may be defined with
the use of such distinguished sets, on top of the thereby defined ‘logical
values’.
In what follows, it is first shown that every purely monotonic single-
conclusion consequence relation is characterized by a class of B-matrices
with respect to q-entailment as well as with respect to p-entailment, and
it is observed that, as a result, every purely monotonic single-conclusion
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consequence relation has an inferentially four-valued semantics. Next, the
notion of entailment is generalized so as to obtain a two-dimensional notion
of B-entailment, based on B-matrices, that subsumes the above defined no-
tions of t-, f -, q- and p-entailment. In a multiple-conclusion setting, sixteen
notions of entailment are studied in detail, from both an abstract viewpoint
and an inferential viewpoint. It is shown that these notions collapse into
four classes, in terms of their abstract characterizations. The Tarskian no-
tion of consequence is also generalized to the two-dimensional setting by
introducing the notion of a B-consequence relation that subsumes, among
others, the notions of q- and p-consequence. Moreover, an abstract charac-
terization of B-consequence relations by classes of B-matrices is presented.
Next, the Suszko Reduction is generalized to show that any B-consequence
relation has, in general, an inferentially four-valued characterization. Fi-
nally, for any given specific B-entailment relation, it is shown that it may
accommodate in a natural way up to nine one-dimensional notions of en-
tailment of different kinds.
2. Abstract characterization of single-conclusion purely
monotonic consequence relations
In this section we show that every purely monotonic consequence relation
C ⊆ 2L×L—namely, a relation respecting axiom (Mon)— is characterized
by a class of B-matrices with respect to q-entailment as well as by a class of
B-matrices with respect to p-entailment. Given Γ∪{ϕ} ⊆ L and C ⊆ 2L×L,
we shall write C(Γ) for {ϕ | (Γ, ϕ) ∈ C}. Note that in terms of the latter
unary operation on 2L, monotonicity means simply that C(Φ) ⊆ C(Φ∪Ψ).
Let C ⊆ 2L×L be a purely monotonic consequence relation. For every
Γ ⊆ L, the tuple MqΓ = 〈L,C(Γ),L \ Γ, {id}〉, where id is the identity
mapping on L, is a B-matrix. We call MqΓ the Lindenbaum B-matrix of Γ
with respect to q-entailment and set BqC = {M
q
Γ | Γ ⊆ L}.
Theorem 1. Every purely monotonic consequence relation C is character-
ized by some class of Lindenbaum B-matrices with respect to q-entailment.
Proof: We show that C is characterized by BqC.
(⇒) Let ϕ ∈ C(Γ), let Mq∆ be an arbitrary B-matrix from B
q
C, and suppose
that Γ ∩ (L \∆) = ∅ and hence Γ ⊆ ∆. By monotonicity, we know that
C(Γ) ⊆ C(∆). Therefore, Γ |=q
M
q
∆
ϕ. Since ∆ was arbitrary, it follows that
Γ |=q
B
q
C
ϕ.
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(⇐) Suppose that Γ |=q
B
q
C
ϕ. We then have Γ |=q
M
q
∆
ϕ for everyMq∆ ∈ B
q
C. In
particular, Γ |=q
M
q
Γ
ϕ. Since Γ∩(L\Γ) = ∅, we conclude that ϕ ∈ C(Γ).
Let C ⊆ 2L × L be a purely monotonic consequence relation. For
every Γ ⊆ L, the tuple MpΓ = 〈L,Γ,L \ C(Γ), {id}〉 is a B-matrix. We call
M
p
Γ the Lindenbaum B-matrix of Γ with respect to p-entailment and set
BpC = {M
p
Γ | Γ ⊆ L}.
Theorem 2. Every purely monotonic consequence relation C is character-
ized by some class of Lindenbaum B-matrices with respect to p-entailment.
Proof: We show that C is characterized by BpC.
(⇒) Let ϕ ∈ C(Γ), let Mp∆ be an arbitrary B-matrix from B
p
C, and suppose
that Γ ⊆ ∆. By monotonicity, we know that C(Γ) ⊆ C(∆). Therefore
ϕ 6∈ L \ C(∆) and thus Γ |=p
M
p
∆
ϕ. Since ∆ was arbitrary, it follows that
Γ |=p
B
p
C
ϕ.
(⇐) Suppose that Γ |=p
B
p
C
ϕ. Then Γ |=p
M
p
∆
ϕ for every Mp∆ ∈ B
p
C. In
particular, Γ |=p
M
p
Γ
ϕ. Since Γ is the set of designated values of MpΓ, we
have ϕ 6∈ L \ C(Γ), and hence ϕ ∈ C(Γ).
If we have homomorphic valuations in mind, a few adjustments in the
above characterizations are in order. In particular, the Lindenbaum matri-
ces M
q
Γ and M
p
Γ are in such case redefined so that instead of S = {id} we
take S = Hom(L,L).
Theorem 3. Every substitution-invariant purely monotonic consequence
relation C is characterized by some class of B-matrices with respect to q-
entailment, with homomorphic valuations.
Proof: We show again that C is characterized by BqC.
(⇒) Let ϕ ∈ C(Γ), let Mq∆ = 〈L,C(∆),L \∆,Hom(L,L)〉 be an arbitrary
B-matrix from BqC, and let σ be an arbitrary endomorphism of L for which
σ(Γ) ∩ (L \∆) = ∅. Then σ(Γ) ⊆ ∆. By substitution-invariance, σ(ϕ) ∈
C(σ(Γ)), and by monotonicity, C(σ(Γ)) ⊆ C(∆). Thus, σ(ϕ) ∈ C(∆).
Therefore, Γ |=q
M
q
∆
ϕ. Since ∆ was arbitrary, it follows that Γ |=q
B
q
C
ϕ.
(⇐) Suppose that Γ |=q
B
q
C
ϕ. Then Γ |=q
M
q
∆
ϕ for every Mq∆ ∈ B
q
C. In par-
ticular, Γ |=q
M
q
Γ
ϕ. Since the identity mapping id on L is an endomorphism
of L, and Γ ∩ (L \ Γ) = ∅, it follows that ϕ ∈ C(Γ).
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Theorem 4. Every substitution-invariant purely monotonic consequence
relation C is characterized by some class of B-matrices with respect to p-
entailment, with homomorphic valuations.
Proof: We show again that C is characterized by BpC.
(⇒) Let ϕ ∈ C(Γ), let Mp∆ = 〈L,∆,L \ C(∆),Hom(L,L)〉 be an arbitrary
B-matrix from BpC, and let σ be an arbitrary endomorphism of L with
σ(Γ) ⊆ ∆. By substitution-invariance, σ(ϕ) ∈ C(σ(Γ)), and by monotonic-
ity, C(σ(Γ)) ⊆ C(∆). Therefore σ(ϕ) 6∈ L\C(∆) and thus Γ |=q
M
q
∆
ϕ. Since
∆ was arbitrary, we conclude that Γ |=q
B
p
C
ϕ.
(⇐) Suppose that Γ |=p
B
p
C
ϕ. Then Γ |=p
M
p
∆
ϕ for every Mp∆ ∈ B
p
C. In
particular, Γ |=p
M
p
Γ
ϕ. Since C(Γ)∩(L\C(Γ)) = ∅, we obtain ϕ ∈ C(Γ).
Given the above characterizations, it is possible to upgrade the machin-
ery behind the so-called Suszko Reduction, as will be done in Section 5, to
show that every monotonic relation C ⊆ 2L×L has an at most four-valued
(in general non-truth-functional) semantics. Let M = 〈V,Y,N, S〉 be a
B-matrix. It is enough then to build out of this a B-matrix M′ which is in-
distinguishable from M from the viewpoint of q- as well as of p-entailment,
by setting M′ = 〈{F,N,B, T}, {B, T}, {F,B}, {ν4 | ν ∈}〉 where
ν4(ϕ) =


F if ν(ϕ) ∈
Y
∩ N
N if ν(ϕ) ∈
Y
∩ N
B if ν(ϕ) ∈ Y ∩ N
T if ν(ϕ) ∈ Y ∩ N
It is not difficult to see that for any Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L, we have Γ |=q
M
ϕ iff
Γ |=q
M′
ϕ and Γ |=p
M
ϕ iff Γ |=p
M′
ϕ (for a more general and detailed version
of this result, check the proof of Theorem 11).
3. A uniform framework for the study of diverse forms
of entailment
We now introduce a two-dimensional, B-matrix-based notion of semantical
consequence. Consider a B-matrix M = 〈V,Y,N, S〉. The semantical no-
tion of B-entailment canonically induced by the semantics S is defined by
setting:
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Φ11
Φ21
∣∣Φ12
Φ22
is S-valid iff
there is no ν ∈ S such that
ν(Φ11) ⊆ Nand ν(Φ12) ⊆
Y
and
ν(Φ21) ⊆ Y and ν(Φ22) ⊆ N
(B-entailment)
where each Φmn denotes an arbitrary subset of L. Rather than saying that
Φ11
Φ21
∣∣Φ12
Φ22
is S-valid, sometimes we say that
Φ11
Φ21
∣∣Φ12
Φ22
is valid for M, and we
omit the reference to the semantics or to the matrix if the context suffices
to disambiguate it.
From the above definition of distinguished sets, it is straightforward to
note that B-entailment always enjoys, in particular, the following properties
concerning S-validity:
(Iny)
∅
Φ
∣∣Ψ
∅
is valid, whenever Φ ∩Ψ 6= ∅
(Inn) Φ
∅
∣∣∅
Ψ
is valid, whenever Φ ∩Ψ 6= ∅
(C1y) if both
Φ11
Φ21∪{ϕ}
∣∣Φ12
Φ22
and
Φ11
Φ21
∣∣Φ12∪{ϕ}
Φ22
are valid,
then
Φ11
Φ21
∣∣Φ12
Φ22
is valid
(C1n) if both
Φ11∪{ϕ}
Φ21
∣∣Φ12
Φ22
and
Φ11
Φ21
∣∣ Φ12
Φ22∪{ϕ}
are valid,
then
Φ11
Φ21
∣∣Φ12
Φ22
is valid
Any expression of the form
Φ11
Φ21
∣∣Φ12
Φ22
will henceforth be called a B-
statement. In case both Φ11 and Φ22 are empty, we will write the cor-
responding B-statement as
:
Φ21
∣∣Φ12
: , and call it a T-statement (mnemonic:
Y ⇒ Y). In addition, and using a similar notational convention, the ex-
pression
Φ11
:
∣∣ :
Φ22
will be called an F-statement (mnemonic: N⇒ N), the
expression
Φ11
:
∣∣Φ12
: will be called a Q-statement (mnemonic: N⇒ Y), and
the expression
:
Φ21
∣∣ :
Φ22
will be called a P-statement (mnemonic: Y ⇒ N).
In general, we will say about a B-matrix that it allows for gappy rea-
soning in case
Y
∩ N6= ∅ (equivalently,
Y
6⊆ N or N6⊆ Y), and say that
it allows for glutty reasoning in case Y ∩ N 6= ∅ (equivalently, N 6⊆
Y
or
Y 6⊆ N). It is easy to check that the following properties are respected
whenever glutty reasoning is not allowed for:
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(Inu)
∅
Φ
∣∣∅
Ψ
is valid, whenever Φ ∩Ψ 6= ∅
(C1u) if both
Φ11∪{ϕ}
Φ21
∣∣Φ12
Φ22
and
Φ11
Φ21
∣∣Φ12∪{ϕ}
Φ22
are valid,
then
Φ11
Φ21
∣∣Φ12
Φ22
is valid
and the following properties are respected whenever gappy reasoning is not
allowed for:
(Ina) Φ
∅
∣∣Ψ
∅
if valid, whenever Φ ∩Ψ 6= ∅
(C1a) if both
Φ11
Φ21∪{ϕ}
∣∣Φ12
Φ22
and
Φ11
Φ21
∣∣ Φ12
Φ22∪{ϕ}
are valid,
then
Φ11
Φ21
∣∣Φ12
Φ22
is valid
Note that a B-matrix with a semantics S allows for gappy reasoning iff the
Q-statement
ϕ
:
∣∣ϕ
: fails to be S-valid, for some ϕ ∈ L, and it allows for glutty
reasoning iff the P-statement
:
ϕ
∣∣ :
ϕ fails to be S-valid, for some ϕ ∈ L.
Fixed a B-matrix M, and the collection S of all T-statements validated
by its semantics, we associate to M a one-dimensional gt-entailment rela-
tion |=gt ⊆ 2L × 2L by setting Φ |=gt Ψ iff :
Φ
∣∣Ψ
: is in S. Along the same
lines, we define a one-dimensional gf-entailment relation |=gf ⊆ 2L × 2L
from the collection of all F-statements validated by the semantics of M.
Similarly, we define a gq-entailment relation and a gp-entailment relation,
respectively, from the collection of all Q-statements and the collection of
all P-statements validated by the semantics of M. For each such notion of
gx-entailment we define a one-dimensional gx\u-entailment relation from a
collection of X-statements together with the assumption (expressed by an
appropriate collection of P-statements, as pointed out above) that M does
not allow for glutty reasoning, and define a gx\a-entailment relation from
a collection of X-statements together with the assumption (expressed by
a collection of Q-statements) that M does not allow for gappy reasoning.
Analogously, a gx\ua-entailment relation will be defined from a collection of
X-statements together with the assumption thatM allows neither for glutty
nor for gappy reasoning. A gt\ua-entailment relation overM will here more
simply be called a t-entailment relation over M, and a gf\ua-entailment re-
lation over M will be called an f-entailment relation over M. In addition,
a gq\u-entailment relation over M will here more simply be called a q-
entailment relation over M, and a gp\u-entailment relation over M will
be called a p-entailment relation over M. To simplify notation, we shall
also use wq instead of gq\ua, and wp instead of gp\ua. Finally, gp\a-
entailment relations over M may be said to be ‘dual’ to q-entailment (they
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consist in collections of P-statements disallowing gaps, instead of collec-
tions of Q-statements disallowing gluts), and will henceforth be referred to
as d-entailment relations. Analogously, gq\a-entailment relations over M
dualize p-entailment, and will henceforth be referred to as b-entailment re-
lations.3 Please refer to Table 1 for a compilation of the above definitions
and notational conventions.4
It is easy to attest that a B-matrix allowing for gappy reasoning does
not in general give support to (Ina) and (C1a). To check this, it suffices
to consider a B-matrix such that Y ∪ N 6= V and consider a semantics
containing a valuation ν and some ϕ ∈ L such that ν(ϕ) ∈
Y
∩ N. The
failure of (Ina) —and the ensuing failure of ϕ |=q ϕ, in general— justi-
fies why q-entailment is often said to be ‘non-reflexive’, while the failure
of (C1a) —and the fact that Φ |=p Ψ does not necessarily follow from
Φ ∪ {ϕ} |=p Ψ and Φ |=p Ψ ∪ {ϕ}— justifies why p-entailment is said
to be ‘non-transitive’. For analogous reasons, d-entailment also fails, in
general, to be reflexive, and b-entailment also fails, in general, to be tran-
sitive. At any rate, in case a B-matrix identifies designatedness with non-
antidesignatedness (i.e., in case it takes Y = N) and identifies antidesig-
natedness with non-designatedness (i.e., it takes N =
Y
), then it should be
clear that the properties called (Inx) and (C1x), for x ∈ {y, n, a, u}, are all
enjoyed by the corresponding B-entailment relation, and there is in such a
situation no difference in semantic status to be found between T-, F-, Q-
and P-statements.
4. Consequence in one and in two dimensions
Following Shoesmith & Smiley’s [23], a symmetrical one-dimensional gener-
alization of the Tarskian notion of consequence is given by a 2-place relation
·  · on subsets of L subject to the following axioms:
3The attentive reader will have noticed that q-entailment and p-entailment general-
ize to a multiple-conclusion environment the notions of q-entailment and p-entailment
introduced in Section 1. Moreover, it is worth noting that the notion of d-entailment, as
dual to q-entailment, was introduced in a single-conclusion environment by Malinowski
in [17].
4As mnemonics, we let ‘g’ stand for ‘generalized’, ‘w’ for ‘weakened’, ‘a’ for ‘gaps’
and ‘u’ for ‘gluts’.
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x-entailment X-statements logical values matrix geometry
t T:
:
Φ
∣∣Ψ
: (Y⇒Y )
neither gaps
nor gluts
Y
Y= N N=
Yf F: Φ:
∣∣ :
Ψ
( N⇒ N)
wq Q: Φ:
∣∣Ψ
: ( N⇒Y)
wp P:
:
Φ
∣∣ :
Ψ
(Y⇒ N)
gt\u T
no gluts:
:
ϕ
∣∣ :
ϕ
Y
Y N
gf\u F
q Q
p P
gt\a T
no gaps:
ϕ
:
∣∣ϕ
:
Y
Y Ngf\a F
b (dual-p) Q
d (dual-q) P
gt T
may allow
for both
gappy
and glutty
reasoning
Y N
Y
gf F
gq Q
gp P
Table 1. Some one-dimensional notions of entailment over B-matrices
(Over) Φ  Ψ, whenever Φ ∩Ψ 6= ∅
(1Ext) if Φ  Ψ, then Φ ∪ Φ′  Ψ ∪Ψ′
(CTrn) given Π ⊆ L, if Φ ∪ Σ  Ψ ∪ (Π \ Σ) for every Σ ⊆ Π,
then Φ  Ψ
Above, ‘Over’, ‘Ext’ and ‘CTrn’ stand, respectively, for overlap, extend-
ability and (cumulative) transitivity. Whenever there is need to avoid
ambiguity, instead of simply writing Φ  Ψ we shall say that
[
Φ ; Ψ
]
holds according to ·  ·. We omit the reference to the consequence relation
if the context suffices to disambiguate it.
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While, on the one hand, it is an easy exercise to check that t-, f-, gt-,
gf-, gt\u-, gt\a-, gf\u-, gf\a-, wq-, and wp-entailment relations all respect
the above axioms, on the other hand it is well known that any relation
respecting these axioms may be characterized by an appropriate class of
matrices. We revise such result in the context of B-consequence and B-
entailment by showing first that for each particular symmetrical Tarskian
consequence relation C there is a t-entailment relation that characterizes
it in terms of families of B-matrices. For that matter we will say that a
subset ∆ of L is t-closed if
[
∆ ; (L \∆)
]
fails to hold (according to C),
and we will associate to such t-closed set the semantical model given by
a B-matrix Mt = 〈L,Y,N, S〉 where Y = ∆, N = L \ ∆, and S contains
just the semantical model given by the identity mapping id on L. We call
Lindenbaum t-bundle BtC the family of B-matrices associated to all the
t-closed subsets of L. Then:
Theorem 5. Any t-consequence relation C is sound and complete with
respect to BtC, that is,
[
Φ ; Ψ
]
holds according to C iff Φ |=t Ψ is SBt
C
-
valid.
Proof: (⇒) Suppose Φ |=t Ψ is not SBt
C
-valid. By the definition of t-
entailment, this is to say that
:
Φ
∣∣Ψ
: is not SBtC-valid. So, there must be
some B-matrix 〈L,Y,L\Y, {id}〉 in the Lindenbaum t-bundle BtC for which:
Φ
∣∣Ψ
: fails to be valid. By the definition of S-validity, and taking into
account that id is the identity mapping on L, it follows that Φ ⊆ Y and
Ψ ⊆ L \ Y. By the very definition of BtC, we know that Y is t-closed, thus[
Y ; (L \ Y)
]
fails to hold according to C. Using (1Ext), we then conclude
that
[
Φ ; Ψ
]
fails to hold according to C.
(⇐) Suppose now that
[
Φ ; Ψ
]
fails to hold according to C. By (CTrn),
we know that there must be some Y ⊆ L such that
[
Φ ∪ Y ; Ψ ∪ (L \ Y)
]
fails to hold according to C. By (Over), it follows that Φ ⊆ Y and Ψ ⊆
L \ Y. Thus, by the definition of t-entailment, we see that Φ |=t Ψ is not
valid, that is, the T-statement
:
Φ
∣∣Ψ
: is not valid according to the B-matrix
M
t = 〈L,Y,L \ Y, {id}〉. So, a fortiori, this same T-statement also fails to
be valid according to BtC.
The very same result holds for the gt-, gt\a- and gt\u-entailment relations,
for which the notion of t-closure applies equally well. It is easy to adapt that
result for f-entailment. Indeed, call f-closed any subset ∆ of L such that
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[
(L \∆) ; ∆
]
fails to hold (according to a given consequence relation C),
associate to such f-closed set a B-matrix Mf = 〈L,L \ ∆,∆, {id}〉, and
let the corresponding Lindenbaum f-bundle be the family of B-matrices
associated to the f-closed subsets of L. The necessary adjustments in the
proof of Theorem 5 are then immediate. Again, the very same result holds
for the gt-, gf\a- and gf\u-entailment relations. In addition, either result
may be adapted to the case of wq- and wp-entailment relations — here,
given that the latter entailment relations are neither gappy nor glutty, one
may use the fact that Y = Nand N =
Y
.
We prove next an analogous result for q-entailment and its dual. To
axiomatize q-entailment we will make use of extendability and transitivity.
Accordingly, a q-consequence relation will be a relation subject to axioms
(1Ext) and (CTrn). It is an easy exercise to check that q-entailment rela-
tions respect both these axioms. Given a q-consequence relation C, and two
disjoint subsets ∆1 and ∆2 of L, we will say that 〈∆1,∆2〉 is a q-closed pair
if
[
L \∆2 ; L \∆1
]
fails to hold (according to C), and we will associate to
such q-closed pair a B-matrix Mq = 〈L,Y,N, S〉 where Y = ∆1, N = ∆2,
and S contains just the identity mapping id on L. We call Lindenbaum
q-bundle BqC the family of B-matrices associated to all the q-closed pairs
of L. We can then prove that:
Theorem 6. Any q-consequence relation C is sound and complete with
respect to BqC, that is,
[
Φ ; Ψ
]
holds according to C iff Φ |=q Ψ is SBq
C
-
valid.
Proof: (⇒) Suppose Φ |=q Ψ is not SBq
C
-valid. By the definition of q-
entailment, this is to say that Φ:
∣∣Ψ
: is not SBqC -valid. So, in the Lindenbaum
q-bundle BqC there must be some B-matrix 〈L,Y,N, {id}〉 where Y ∩N = ∅
for which Φ:
∣∣Ψ
: fails to be valid. By the definition of B-entailment, it follows
that Φ ⊆ Nand Ψ ⊆
Y
. By the very definition of BqC, we know that 〈Y,N〉
is q-closed, thus
[
N;
Y
]
fails to hold according to C. Then, using (1Ext)
we conclude that
[
Φ ; Ψ
]
fails to hold according to C.
(⇐) Suppose now that
[
Φ ; Ψ
]
fails to hold according to C. By (CTrn)
we know that there must be some set N⊆ L such that
[
Φ ∪ N; Ψ ∪
Y
]
,
where
Y
= L \ N, fails to hold according to C. Note that L \ (Ψ ∪
Y
) and
L \ (Φ ∪ N) are disjoint, thus 〈Ψ ∪
Y
,Φ ∪ N〉 is a q-closed pair according
to C. By the definition of q-entailment, we then see that Φ |=q Ψ is not
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valid, that is, the Q-statement Φ:
∣∣Ψ
: is not valid according to the B-matrix
M
q = 〈L,L\(Ψ∪
Y
),L\(Φ∪ N), {id}〉. So, a fortiori, this same Q-statement
also fails to be valid according to BqC.
It is easy to adapt this result for d-entailment. In that case, given
a q-consequence relation C, we might call d-closed any pair 〈∆1,∆2〉 of
sets such that ∆1 ∪∆2 = L and
[
∆1 ; ∆2
]
fails to hold (according to C),
associate to such d-closed pair a B-matrix Md = 〈L,∆1,∆2, {id}〉, and
let the corresponding Lindenbaum d-bundle be the family of B-matrices
associated to the d-closed subsets of L. The necessary adjustments in the
proof of Theorem 6 are then immediate.
To prove an analogous result for p-entailment (Y ⇒ N) and its dual, we
first define a p-consequence relation as a relation subject to axioms (Over)
and (1Ext). It is an easy exercise to check that p-entailment respects axioms
(Over) and (1Ext). Given a p-consequence relation C, and two disjoint
subsets ∆1 and ∆2 of L, we will say that 〈∆1,∆2〉 is a p-closed pair if[
∆1 ; ∆2
]
fails to hold (according to C), and we associate to such p-closed
pair a B-matrix Mp = 〈L,Y,N, S〉 where Y = ∆1, N = ∆2, and S = {id}.
We call Lindenbaum p-bundle BpC the family of B-matrices associated to all
the p-closed pairs of L. We can then prove that:
Theorem 7. Any p-consequence relation C is sound and complete with
respect to BpC, that is,
[
Φ ; Ψ
]
holds according to C iff Φ |=p Ψ is SBp
C
-
valid.
Proof: (⇒) Suppose Φ |=p Ψ is not SBp
C
-valid. By the definition of p-
entailment, this is to say that
:
Φ
∣∣ :
Ψ
is not SBp
C
-valid. So, in the Lindenbaum
p-bundle BpC there must be some B-matrix 〈L,Y,N, {id}〉 where Y ∩N = ∅
for which
:
Φ
∣∣ :
Ψ
fails to be valid. By the definition of B-entailment, it follows
that Φ ⊆ Y and Ψ ⊆ N. By the very definition of BpC, we know that 〈Y,N〉
is p-closed, thus
[
Y ; N
]
fails to hold according to C. Using (1Ext), we
conclude that
[
Φ ; Ψ
]
fails to hold according to C.
(⇐) Suppose now that
[
Φ ; Ψ
]
fails to hold according to C. By (Over), it
follows that Φ and Ψ are disjoint, thus 〈Φ,Ψ〉 is a p-closed pair according
to C. By the definition of p-entailment, this implies that Φ |=p Ψ fails to
be valid, given that the P-statement
:
Φ
∣∣ :
Ψ
fails to be valid according to the
B-matrix Mp = 〈L,Φ,Ψ, {id}〉. So, a fortiori, this same P-statement also
fails to be valid according to BpC.
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To adapt this result for b-entailment, given a p-consequence relation C,
we might call b-closed any pair 〈∆1,∆2〉 of sets such that ∆1 ∪ ∆2 = L
and
[
L \∆2 ; L \∆1
]
fails to hold (according to C), associate to such b-
closed pair a B-matrix Mb = 〈L,∆1,∆2, {id}〉, and let the corresponding
Lindenbaum b-bundle be the family of B-matrices associated to all the b-
closed subsets of L. The necessary adjustments in the proof of Theorem 7
are then immediate.
Finally, we shall prove an analogous result that applies to gq-,
gp-, gd- and gb-entailment. All these forms of entailment will be seen
to be characterized by the notion of gq-consequence axiomatized simply by
(1Ext). To start with, it is easy to check that these forms of entailment
do indeed respect (1Ext). Now, given a gq-consequence relation C, and
two arbitrary subsets ∆1 and ∆2 of L, we will say that 〈∆1,∆2〉 is a gq-
closed pair if
[
(L \∆2) ; (L \∆1)
]
fails to hold (according to C), and we
will associate to such gq-closed pair a B-matrix Mgq = 〈L,Y,N, S〉 where
Y = ∆1, N = ∆2, and S contains just the identity mapping id on L. We
call Lindenbaum gq-bundle BgqC the family of B-matrices associated to all
the gq-closed pairs of L. We can then prove that:
Theorem 8. Any gq-consequence relation C is sound and complete with
respect to BgqC , that is,
[
Φ ; Ψ
]
holds according to C iff Φ |=gq Ψ is SBgq
C
-
valid.
Proof: (⇒) Suppose Φ |=gq Ψ is not SBgq
C
-valid. By the definition of gq-
entailment, this is to say that Φ:
∣∣Ψ
: is not SBgqC -valid. So, in the Lindenbaum
gq-bundle BgqC there must be some B-matrix 〈L,Y,N, {id}〉 for which
Φ
:
∣∣Ψ
:
fails to be valid. By the definition of B-entailment, it follows that Φ ⊆ N
and Ψ ⊆
Y
. By the very definition of BgqC , we know that 〈Y,N〉 is gq-closed,
thus
[
N;
Y
]
fails to hold according to C. Using (1Ext), we conclude that[
Φ ; Ψ
]
fails to hold according to C.
(⇐) Suppose now that
[
Φ ; Ψ
]
fails to hold according to C. So, 〈L\Ψ,L\Φ〉
is a gq-closed pair. By the definition of gq-entailment, this implies that
Φ |=gq Ψ fails to be valid, given that the Q-statement Φ:
∣∣Ψ
: fails to be valid
according to the B-matrix Mgq = 〈L,L\Ψ,L\Φ, {id}〉. So, a fortiori, this
same Q-statement also fails to be valid according to BgqC .
The latter applies to gb-entailment without modifications, given that in
such case we are dealing again with an arbitrary collection of Q-statements.
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To adapt the latter result for arbitrary collections of P-statements that are
characteristic both of gp-entailment and of gd-entailment, we proceed as
follows. Given a gq-consequence relation C, we might call gp-closed any
pair 〈∆1,∆2〉 of L such that
[
∆1 ; ∆2
]
fails to hold (according to C),
associate to such gp-closed pair a B-matrix Mb = 〈L,∆1,∆2, {id}〉, and
let the corresponding Lindenbaum gp-bundle be the family of B-matrices
associated to the gp-closed subsets of L. The necessary adjustments in the
proof of Theorem 8 are then immediate. The result applies to gd-entailment
without modifications. Note also that such results generalize Theorems 1
and 2 from Section 2.
Following [2], we now introduce a two-dimensional generalization of
the standard multiple-conclusion notion of consequence given by (Over),
(1Ext) and (CTrn). The canonical notion of B-consequence is a 2×2-place
relation ·
·
∥∥ ·
·
on subsets of L subject to the following axioms:
(Overy) Φ11Φ21
∥∥Φ12
Φ22
, whenever Φ21 ∩ Φ12 6= ∅
(Overn) Φ11Φ21
∥∥Φ12
Φ22
, whenever Φ11 ∩ Φ22 6= ∅
(2Ext) if Φ11Φ21
∥∥Φ12
Φ22
, then Φ11∪Ψ11Φ21∪Ψ21
∥∥Φ12∪Ψ12
Φ22∪Ψ22
(CTrny) given Π ⊆ L,
if Φ11Φ21∪Σ
∥∥Φ12∪(Π\Σ)
Φ22
for every Σ ⊆ Π, then Φ11Φ21
∥∥Φ12
Φ22
(CTrnn) given Π ⊆ L,
if
Φ11∪(Π\Σ)
Φ21
∥∥ Φ12
Φ22∪Σ
for every Σ ⊆ Π, then Φ11Φ21
∥∥Φ12
Φ22
Whenever there is need to avoid ambiguity, instead of simply writing
Φ11
Φ21
∥∥Φ12
Φ22
we shall say that
[Φ11 ; Φ21
Φ12 ; Φ22
]
holds according to ·
·
∥∥ ·
·
. The veri-
fication that B-entailment is a form of B-consequence, i.e., that it respects
all the above axioms, is an easy exercise.
An important property of consequence relations defined over languages
with algebraic character is the so-called substitution-invariance
(a.k.a. ‘structurality’), that can here be represented by the following axiom:
(SI) for every endomorphism σ of L, if Φ11Φ21
∥∥Φ12
Φ22
, then
σ(Φ11)
σ(Φ21)
∥∥σ(Φ12)
σ(Φ22)
It is easy to see that any B-matrix based on a truth-functional semantics
respects the axiom (SI).
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We proceed to show that any particular B-consequence relation C may
be given an adequate semantics in terms of B-entailment. For that matter
we will say that the pair 〈Ψy,Ψn〉 of subsets of L is B-closed if
[ L\Ψn ; Ψy
L\Ψy ; Ψn
]
fails to hold (according to C), and we will associate to such B-closed pair
a B-matrix MB = 〈L,Y,N, S〉 where Y = Ψy, N = Ψn, and S contains
just the identity mapping id on L. We call Lindenbaum B-bundle BBC the
family of B-matrices associated to all the B-closed pairs of subsets of L.
The following result shows that any B-consequence relation may be fully
characterized by its associated Lindenbaum B-bundle.
Theorem 9. Any B-consequence relation C is sound and complete with
respect to BBC , that is,
[Φ11 ; Φ21
Φ12 ; Φ22
]
holds according to C iff
Φ11
Φ21
∣∣Φ12
Φ22
is SBB
C
-
valid.
Proof: (⇒) Suppose
Φ11
Φ21
∣∣Φ12
Φ22
is not SBB
C
-valid. This means that there is
some B-matrix 〈L,Y,N, {id}〉 in the Lindenbaum B-bundle BBC for which
Φ11
Φ21
∣∣Φ12
Φ22
fails to be valid. By the definition of S-validity, and taking into
account that id is the identity mapping on L, it follows that Φ21 ⊆ Y,
Φ11 ⊆ L \ N, Φ22 ⊆ N and Φ12 ⊆ L \ Y. Given that, by the very definition
of BBC , the pair 〈Y,N〉 is B-closed, we know that
[ L\N ; Y
L\Y ; N
]
fails to hold.
Using (2Ext), we conclude then that
[Φ11 ; Φ21
Φ12 ; Φ22
]
fails to hold.
(⇐) Suppose now that
[Φ11 ; Φ21
Φ12 ; Φ22
]
fails to hold. By (CTrny), we know that
there must be some Y ⊆ L such that
[ Φ11 ; Φ21∪Y
Φ12∪(L\Y) ; Φ22
]
fails to hold. By
(Overy), it follows that Φ21 ⊆ Y and Φ12 ⊆ L \ Y. Analogously, using
(CTrnn) and (Overn) we conclude that Φ11 ⊆ L \ N and Φ22 ⊆ N. Thus,
it follows by the definition of B-entailment that the B-statement
Φ11
Φ21
∣∣Φ12
Φ22
is not valid according to the B-matrix 〈L,Y,N, {id}〉, so a fortiori it also
fails to be valid according to BBC .
An important specialization of the above result may be proved in case
we associate B-consequence to a language and a semantics structured in
the appropriate ways:
Theorem 10. Any substitution-invariant B-consequence relation C is char-
acterizable by the Lindenbaum B-bundle of truth-functional B-matrices BBC .
Proof: (⇒) Suppose
Φ11
Φ21
∣∣Φ12
Φ22
is not SBB
C
-valid. This means that there is
some truth-functional B-matrix 〈L,Y,N,Hom(L,L)〉 in the Lindenbaum B-
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bundle BBC for which
Φ11
Φ21
∣∣Φ12
Φ22
fails to be valid. Note that in this B-matrix
valuations are simply identified with substitutions. By definition of S-
validity, it follows that there is some substitution σ ∈ Hom(L,L) such that
σ(Φ21) ⊆ Y, σ(Φ11) ⊆ L \ N, σ(Φ22) ⊆ N and σ(Φ12) ⊆ L \ Y. Given that
the pair 〈Y,N〉 is B-closed, by the definition of BBC , we know that
[ L\N ; Y
L\Y ; N
]
fails to hold. Using (2Ext), we conclude that
[ σ(Φ11) ; σ(Φ21)
σ(Φ12) ; σ(Φ22)
]
fails to hold.
Finally, from (SI) it follows that
[Φ11 ; Φ21
Φ12 ; Φ22
]
fails to hold.
(⇐) This direction follows closely the proof of Theorem 9(⇐). Indeed, note
that id is an endomorphism of L, and invoke the definition of validity for
B-entailment.
Substitution-invariant versions of Theorems 5, 6, 7 and 8 may be easily
obtained by following a similar line of reasoning as in Theorem 10.
5. Inferential many-valuedness
Generalizing Suszko’s Thesis, one may now show that a B-consequence
relation is, in general, inferentially four-valued. For that purpose, consider
the following set V4 = {F,N,B, T} of truth-values. Given a B-matrix
M = 〈V,Y,N, S〉, let ♭ : V −→ V4 be defined by setting:
♭(w) =


F if w ∈
Y
∩ N
N if w ∈
Y
∩ N
B if w ∈ Y ∩ N
T if w ∈ Y ∩ N
TF
B
N
Y
N
YN
On top of this definition, consider the B-matrixM4=〈V4,{B,T},{F,B}, S4〉,
where S4 = {♭ ◦ ν | ν ∈ S}. Then it is not hard to check that:
Theorem 11. M and M4 characterize the same logic, that is,
Φ11
Φ21
∣∣Φ12
Φ22
is
S-valid iff it is S4-valid.
Proof: Obviously, any valuation ν in S that witnesses the invalidity of
Φ11
Φ21
∣∣Φ12
Φ22
according toM translates into a valuation ν4 = ♭◦ν that witnesses
the invalidity of
Φ11
Φ21
∣∣Φ12
Φ22
according to M4. For the converse direction,
let ν be a valuation in M4 such that ν(Φ21) ⊆ {B, T}, ν(Φ11) ⊆ {N,T},
ν(Φ22) ⊆ {F,B} and ν(Φ12) ⊆ {F,N}. By definition of M4, we know that
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ν = ♭◦νM for some νM ∈ S. Let L
T ⊆ Φ21∪Φ11 be defined as ν
−1({T}) (the
inverse image of T under ν), let LB ⊆ Φ21 ∪ Φ22 be defined as ν
−1({B}),
let LN ⊆ Φ11 ∪ Φ12 be defined as ν
−1({N}), and let LF ⊆ Φ22 ∪ Φ12 be
defined as ν−1({F}).
Now, given ϕ ∈ Φ21, we have to show that νM(ϕ) ∈ Y. Note that ν(ϕ)
belongs to ν(Φ21) (the direct image of Φ21 under ν), so by the assumption
that ν(Φ21) ⊆ {B, T}, it follows that ν(ϕ) ∈ {B, T}, thus ϕ ∈ L
B ∪ LT =
ν−1({B, T}). But by the definition of ♭, we know that ♭(νM(ϕ)) = ν(ϕ) ∈
{B, T} iff νM(ϕ) ∈ Y. We reason in an analogous way to check that
νM(ϕ) ∈ Nfor ϕ ∈ Φ11, that νM(ϕ) ∈ N for ϕ ∈ Φ22, and that νM(ϕ) ∈
Y
for ϕ ∈ Φ12.
Note that when gappy reasoning is not allowed for (i.e., in case
Y
∩ N=
∅), then V4 reduces to V
⊤
3
= {F,B, T}, and when glutty reasoning is not
allowed for (i.e., in case Y ∩ N = ∅), then V4 reduces to V
⊥
3
= {F,N, T}.
Finally, in case neither gappy nor glutty reasoning are allowed for, then
V4 reduces to V2 = {F, T}. Considering the definitions summarized in
Table 1 (check in particular its last column), one may accordingly say that,
in principle, from an inferential viewpoint:
(M1) t- and f-entailment are inferentially two-valued;
the same applies to wq- and wp-entailment
(M2) q-, d-, p-, b-entailment are all inferentially three-valued
the same applies to gt\u-, gt\a-, gf\u- and gf\a-entailment
(M3) q- and p-entailment may allow for gaps;
b- and d-entailment may allow for gluts
(M4) all generalized notions of entailment
(gx-entailment, for x ∈ {t, f, q, p}),
are inferentially four-valued
As we have seen in the previous sections, several in principle distinct
one-dimensional consequence relations may be defined from any given B-
consequence relation. We have also just shown, above, that such conse-
quence relations can be endowed with semantics based on at most four
inferential values, and so we may hereupon use the latter to go about in-
vestigating the former. Given a specific B-consequence relation C, by the
t-aspect of C we will refer to all the T-statements that hold in C together
with the assumptions that neither gaps nor gluts are present (notation:
|=tC). Analogously, the gt-aspect of C will refer to all the T-statements
that hold in C, without the assumptions about gaps and gluts (notation:
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p,wp, t, f,wq, b
gt\u gf\u gt\a gf\a
q, gq gt gf gp, d
Fig. 1: Aspects of a given B-entailment relation
|=gtC ). We may similarly define the x-aspect of C for each of the forms of
x-entailment described in Table 1. From that perspective, we explore in
what follows the set-theoretic inter-relations between the various notions
of entailment introduced before.
Theorem 12. Let C be a B-consequence relation over a language L. Then,
the Hasse diagram in Figure 1 represents all connections in terms of strict
set-theoretic inclusion between the various aspects of C. In other words:
(1) If x1 is above x2, then |=
x2
C ⊆ |=
x1
C
(2) If x1 is above x2, then |=
x2
C 6⊇ |=
x1
C
(3) If x1 and x2 are not comparable, then |=
x1
C 6⊆ |=
x2
C and |=
x2
C 6⊆ |=
x1
C
Proof: For the first part of the proof, let M4 = 〈{F,N,B, T}, {B, T},
{F,B}, S〉 be an inferentially four-valued characterization of C. Checking
the equalities ( |=qC = |=
gq
C , etc) is an easy exercise using the definitions
summarized in Table 1, and is left to the reader. To check that |=qC ⊆
|=
gt\u
C , let us suppose that Φ |=
gt\u
C Ψ is not S-valid. In that case, there
must be some ν ∈ S such that (a) ν(Φ) ⊆ {B, T} \ {B} = {T} and
(b) ν(Ψ) ⊆ {F,N}\{B}. But from (a) it follows that (c) ν(Φ) ⊆ {N,T} =
{N,T} \ {B}. So, from (c) and (b) we conclude that Φ |=qC Ψ is not S-
valid. Next, to check that |=
gt\u
C ⊆|=
t
C , we suppose this time that Φ |=
t
C Ψ
is not S-valid. This means that there must be some ν ∈ S such that (a′)
ν(Φ) ⊆ {B, T} \ {N,B} = {T} and (b′) ν(Ψ) ⊆ {F,N} \ {N,B} = {F}.
From (b′) we conclude that (c′) ν(Ψ) ⊆ {F,N} = {F,N}\{B}. Then, from
(a′) and (c′) it follows that Φ |=
gt\u
C Ψ is not S-valid. The remaining ten
inclusions may be checked in a similar way, and the corresponding exercise
is again left to the reader.
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For the second part of the proof, let C be a B-consequence relation
containing the six following unary 4-valued connectives, characterized by
their respective truth-tables:
◦1 ◦2 ◦3 ◦4 ◦5 ◦6
F F F F F F F
N N F B B N F
B F N B F N B
T N N N B B B
Let’s denote by J(x, n) the judgment of the form ϕ |=xC ◦nϕ. We will show
that for each choice of x1, x2 ∈ {t, q, d, gt, gf, gt\u, gt\a, gf\u, gf\a},
with x1 6= x2, there is some n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} such that J(x1, n) is S-
valid while J(x2, n) is not S-valid (or the other way round). Note first
that: (i) J(x, 1) is S-valid iff x ∈ {t, q, gf, gf\u, gf\a}, (ii) J(x, 2) is S-valid
iff x ∈ {t, d, gt\a, gf\a}, (iii) J(x, 3) is S-valid iff x ∈ {t, gt\a, gf\u, gf\a},
(iv) J(x, 4) is S-valid iff x ∈ {t, q, gt\u, gf\u}, (v) J(x, 5) is S-valid iff x ∈
{t, gt\u, gt\a}, and (vi) J(x, 6) is S-valid iff x ∈ {t, gt, gt\u, gt\a}. One may
now evaluate the converses of the twelve inclusions from the first part of
the proof. For instance, to conclude that |=qC 6⊇ |=
gt\u
C one may invoke
either item (v) or item (vi), and to conclude that |=
gt\u
C 6⊇ |=
t
C items (i) or
(ii) or (iii) will do the job. The other ten cases are left as exercise to the
reader.
For the third part of the proof, containing the remaining fourty pairwise
comparisons between one-dimensional entailment relations of various kinds
induced by a given two-dimensional entailment relation, one may again use
the connectives from the second part of the proof. Items (i)–(vi) will suffice
for the reader to complete the argument.
6. Summary and outlook
To sum up, let us recall that in the present paper we have first shown that
every purely monotonic single-conclusion consequence relation is semanti-
cally characterized by a certain class of generalized q-matrices, which we
call B-matrices. We next introduced a two-dimensional multiple-conclusion
notion of entailment based on B-matrices, which provides a uniform frame-
work for studying several different notions of entailment based on des-
ignation, antidesignation, and their complements. Let us underline that
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we take the two-dimensional presentation to be quite useful in compari-
son with a linear presentation, because it nicely supports seeing affinities,
for instance, between different forms of ‘reflexivity’ of entailment, such as
(Iny), (Inn), (Inu) and (Ina), which impose distinct semantic constraints on
the geometry of the underlying matrices. Moreover, the generalization to
a multiple-conclusion framework emphasizes the symmetries between the
four positions of a B-statement, and the multiplicity of inferential values
in B-matrices allows one to accommodate at the same time not only an
understanding of entailment as the preservation of some property from the
premises to the conclusion of an inference, but also other, non-Tarskian
conceptions of semantical consequence such as p- and q-entailment. Here,
we defined the two-dimensional concept of a B-consequence relation, and
presented an abstract characterization of B-consequence relations by classes
of B-matrices, and eventually it was also shown that any B-consequence re-
lation is, in general, inferentially four-valued. Our study is not alone in that
quest: our result about inferential four-valuedness, applied to the multiple-
conclusion one-dimensional framework, may be seen as a particular case of
a result from Humberstone, in [11], where the author analyzes the situation
in which the consequence relations are allowed to involve sets of formulas
from two different languages, both associated to logics characterized in
terms of t-entailment; Ripley and French, in [10], also investigate infer-
ential many-valuedness, its connections with q- and p-entailment, and the
abstract characterizations of the consequence relations thereby involved,
including the purely monotonic case, with an approach based on the well-
known Galois connection between semantics and the abstract notion of
consequence. Such investigations make clear that logic should not be re-
stricted to the study of Tarski-type, Scott-type, or Shoesmith-Smiley-type
consequence relations. The present effort should be seen thus as a contri-
bution to the discussion about the concept of entailment and, hence, also
the understanding of logic as a discipline.
It is worth briefly highlighting here some of the principal novelties
brought by the present study, as well as pointing out some possible di-
rections for further investigation. The multiple-conclusion versions of q-
entailment and p-entailment, here dubbed q-entailment and p-entailment,
have first been introduced in this paper, together with their duals given
by the notions of d-entailment and b-entailment. Figure 2 groups the
one-dimensional notions of entailment hereby defined in terms of their ab-
stract characterizations: (i) t- and gt-entailment, and their duals f- and
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gq, gp
b, p d, q
wq, gt\u, gt\a, gt, t, f, gf, gf\a, gf\u,wp
Fig. 2: Classes of consequence relations, from an abstract viewpoint
gf-entailment have been seen to be characterized by axioms (Over), (1Ext)
and (CTrn), which are known to provide the most natural generalization
of the Tarskian single-conclusion notion of consequence, and the same ap-
plies to other notions of entailment introduced in the present paper; (ii) q-
entailment and its dual d-entailment have been seen to be characterized
by (1Ext) and (CTrn); (iii) p-entailment and its dual b-entailment have
been seen to be characterized by (Over) and (1Ext); in addition, (iv) gq-
and its dual gp-entailment have been seen to be characterized by (1Ext),
that is, by ‘pure monotonicity’. The Hasse diagram in Figure 2 shows how
the classes of entailment relations of each kind are organized according to
set-theoretic inclusion: we have seen, for instance, that each consequence
relation characterized in terms of t-entailment is also characterizable in
terms of f-entailment, and vice versa, we have seen that each of the latter
may be seen as particular cases of some consequence relation characterized
in terms of q-entailment, and so forth.
From the viewpoint of the reduction results presented in Section 5, one
should note in particular that: (i) the t-aspect of a given B-consequence
relation does not in general coincide with its gt-aspect, for the latter allows
for two extra inferential values and consequently more valuations based on
them; (ii) the gt-aspect of a given B-consequence relation treats as a gap
what its gf-aspect treats as a glut, and vice versa, and so they might not co-
incide; (iii) the q-aspect and the p-aspect of a given B-consequence relation
do not in general coincide, even though both allow for gappy reasoning, and
a similar thing might be said about the d-aspect and the b-aspect of a given
B-consequence relation, with the difference that the two latter aspects allow
for glutty instead of gappy reasoning; (iv) the gq-aspect and the gp-aspect
of a given B-consequence do not in general coincide, in spite of both being
in principle logically four-valued and of both respecting the same abstract
axioms. In terms of the sixteen kinds of entailment relation studied in the
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present paper, Figure 1 shows how some two-dimensional notions of con-
sequence may indeed exhibit up to nine different aspects. Of course, one
does not need to rest content with those specific aspects: other interesting
notions of entailment are in principle definable by yet other combinations
of distinguished sets of logical values. One might take it that the different
one-dimensional aspects of a given two-dimensional notion of consequence
play a role similar to the one played by the ‘zero-dimensional’ notion of
tautology with respect to the usual one-dimensional Tarskian consequence
relations. It is worth noticing, at any rate, that the distinct aspects of a
specific B-consequence represent logics on their own right, and might be
taken to vindicate a variety of logical pluralism in which logics of different
kinds may be said to ‘cohabitate’ the same generalized logical structure.
We have presented B-matrices as a natural generalization of q-matrices,
and by explicitly adding a semantics to the notion of logical matrix we have
made it clear that the abstract characterization results apply very naturally
even in the case of consequence relations in which substitution-invariance
is not at issue. From the viewpoint of B-consequence we have also seen
that q-entailment and p-entailment have much more in common than they
might originally have appeared to have. For instance, both of these non-
Tarskian notions of entailment respect the forms of overlap and cumulative
transitivity represented at the diagonals of the two-dimensional syntacti-
cal representation of B-consequence. An explanation of why q-entailment
appears to fail ‘reflexivity’, at the one-dimensional level, is to be found at
the two-dimensional level, where q-consequence is seen to be defined by a
collection of Q-statements but respects a particular form of overlap that
is given only by a P-statement. Explanations of why q-entailment only
respects a weakened form of ‘transitivity’, and also of why p-entailment
appears to fail ‘transitivity’ may also be found at the two-dimensional level
— again p-consequence is defined by a collection of P-statements, but the
appropriate additional notion of transitivity respected by it is only express-
ible as a Q-statement.
The two-dimensional presentation was also adopted in [12] to define
predicate sequent systems for partial logics whose semantics is inferentially
three-valued, and in [1] to define a propositional sequent system for an
inferentially four-valued version of the logic of First Degree Entailment. In
the present paper we have only dealt with specific logics in proving the
second half of Theorem 12. As a matter of fact, it may be shown that any
(non-deterministic) connective of any arity may be characterized in terms of
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appropriate collections of B-statements. We shall however leave the details
of that result, as well as a general proof-theoretic study of B-entailment,
as matter for future work.
It has generally been held in the literature that at least one of the
‘logical values’ obtained by Suszko Reduction represents a distinguished set
of values in the corresponding notion of matrix, by way of an appropriate
(generalized) characteristic function that applies to the algebraic values.
Malinowski [21, p. 1], for example explains that
two facets of many-valuedness — referential and inferential —
are unravelled. The first, fits the standard approach and it
results in multiplication of semantic correlates of sentences,
and not logical values in a proper sense. The second many-
valuedness is a metalogical property of inference and refers to
partition of the matrix universe into more than two disjoint
subsets, used in the definition of inference.
For the generalized version of q-entailment introduced here, we have up-
graded the inferential reduction by exploring a very different strategy in
order to obtain the logical values out of the distinguished subsets used in the
corresponding definition of B-entailment. This way one sees that, in gen-
eral, the distinguished sets of the logical matrices need not be mapped onto
logical values; rather, the logical values play a direct role in defining the
carrier of the matrix obtained through the reduction, but only play an indi-
rect role in defining the notion of entailment. Starting from B-consequence
one obtains inferentially three-valued and inferentially two-valued notions
of entailment by excluding some logical values through the addition of ap-
propriate forms of the axiom (Over). A similar strategy might be used
to go beyond four logical values: for instance, to obtain five logical values
one could naturally add an additional independent distinguished set to the
definition of B-matrix and appropriately add a further dimension to the
corresponding notion of entailment; then, to exclude three out of the eight
logical values thereby induced, one would again add appropriate variations
of the axiom (Over).
The traditional proof of the logical two-valuedness of Tarskian conse-
quence relations relies on the division of the set of truth-values into a set
of designated values and its complement. Given that these sets uniquely
determine one another, the Suszko Reduction may actually be claimed to
demonstrate the ‘logical mono-valuedness’ of Tarskian consequence rela-
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tions, as has been remarked in [27, 24]. Since the four subsets
Y
∩N,
Y
∩ N,
Y∩N, and Y∩ Nthat are singled out from a given B-matrixM = 〈V,Y,N, S〉
to obtain the B-matrix M4 = 〈V4, {B, T}, {F,B}, S4〉 are uniquely deter-
mined by Y, N and their complements, through set-theoretic intersection,
it might now be held that B-consequence relations are, in general, not only
inferentially four-valued, but actually ‘logically bi-valued’.
According to G. Malinowski [20], “[g]etting logical n-valuedness for
n > 3 is tempting” and Malinowski identifies as a first step in that direction
a division of the matrix universe into more than three mutually disjoint
subsets. This might suggest identifying the logical values with mutually
disjoint subsets of V. The disjointness requirement, however, creates a
problem for B-matrices because the set Y ∩ N may in general be non-
empty. Nonetheless, the idea of identifying the logical values with subsets
of V points at an alternative direction into which the notion of B-entailment
can be generalized. Along the lines of R. Wojcicki’s [28, 29] notion of a
ramified (or general) matrix, a generalized B-matrix for a language L could
be defined as a tuple 〈V, D1, . . . , Dn, S〉, where V is a set, Di ⊆ V for every
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and S is a collection of mappings ν : L −→ V . Then
again, set-theoretic combinations of the distinguished subsets Di and their
complements might be used to define notions of entailment that reach far
beyond the ones considered in the present paper.
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